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ABSTRACT
Does the Fourth Amendment apply in cases of cross-border
shootings of foreign nationals, when those shots were fired by
United States Border Patrol agents from American soil, striking a
victim in Mexico?
In oral argument, Petitioner failed to heed the trail of
breadcrumbs strewn at his feet by inquisitive Supreme Court
Justices. A workable, yet narrow rule that would plug the critically
important gap in application of the United States Constitution to
remedy such cross-border atrocities, was not articulated. I propose
one here.
The world’s busiest border is that which is shared between the
United States and Mexico. Our countries are intertwined
economically and historically and have a shared cultural identity.
Justice demands an answer in the affirmative; that the Constitution
applies cross-border not only to remedy this young man’s death, but
also to address inevitable future events.

INTRODUCTION
When United States Border Patrol agent Jesus Mesa murdered
fifteen-year-old
Mexican-national
Sergio
Hernandez,
a
constitutional conundrum erupted that would reach the Supreme
Court. Agent Mesa shot the teen cross-border, invoking issues of
unlawful seizures, officer immunity, and sovereignty. These
shootings have long plagued the U.S.-Mexico border, as has the
utter lack of accountability for the agents involved. These shootings
cannot be justified. Yet, forty-two times in twenty-years, U.S.
agents have shot Mexican nationals in cross-border incidents. No
disciplinary, let alone criminal, measures have been taken. The
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glaring lack of accountability re-raises a question often punted by
the U.S. Supreme Court: Do the rights and privileges guaranteed
by the United States Constitution extend beyond our borders and if
so, in what capacity?
Century-old case law has never squarely addressed the
question of whether the Constitution applies beyond our borders.
However, in cases where extra-territorial constitutionalism is part
of the legal equation, the High Court has repeatedly answered in
the affirmative. Additionally, “there has been an ongoing debate in
the courts and across the country for more than a century over
which, if any, individual constitutional rights can be applied to
restrain governmental actions against non-citizens outside the
United States.”1
The first piece of this puzzle is solved by deciding where, and
when, the Constitution “stops.” In the century-old “Insular Cases,”
the Court first sought to address the extraterritoriality of
constitutional rights.2 Insular’s progeny, Reid v. Covert and
Johnson v. Eisentrager spawned the “impracticable and anomalous”
test which was relied upon, albeit to different ends in more modernera; cases such as United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and
Boumediene v. Bush.3 Verdugo and Boumediene pit the “functional”
and “practical” approach doctrines against one another and also to
the test, with the Boumediene Court seemingly expanding, once and
for all, the notion that the Constitution does, in fact, extend
extraterritorially. The remaining question to answer then, is “in
what capacity” does it apply?4
In oral argument for Hernandez, the Court prodded
Petitioner’s counsel, unsuccessfully, for an articulation of a
workable rule.5 As satisfactory answers were lacking in argument,
it is best to proceed by applying stare decisis and the cumulative

1. Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution
Abroad, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1631 (2013).
2. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 756-57 (2008) (citing Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922)); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904);
Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182
U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) as cases in the long list
of decisions handed down between 1901 and 1922 as part of The Insular Cases).
3. Reid v. Covert, 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950); Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 1160 (2007); United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
4. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312, with
approval, that “the real issue in the Insular Cases was not whether the
Constitution extended to the Philippines or Puerto Rico when we went there,
but which of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation upon the
exercise of executive and legislative power in dealing with new conditions and
requirements.”).
5. Hernandez v. Mesa, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-118 (last visited
May 18, 2017).
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doctrine discussed herein. Additionally, it is important to introduce
fresh theories of application of these factors.
Section I, introduces the proposed “Rule” and discusses both
the history and application of the “functional” and “practical”
approaches utilized by the Court to test the “if” of extraterritorial
constitutionality. In this part, theories of limited or partial United
States control or influence at and across the riverine (dry culvert)
Mexican border are advanced by examining maritime law doctrine
and the border creation itself under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo.
Section II surveys and defines specific proximity contexts
where the previous Section’s Rule might arise, and narrows the
scope of applicability.
Sections III and IV argue that the “force” of the Constitution is
an extension of The United States’ power which flows from the
barrel of a gun, and attaches liability back across the border to
agents acting under color of U.S. law.
Part V looks at the attenuated policy issues associated with
this type of case, centering on questions of international relations
as well as remedies such as a Bivens and other possible liabilities.6
Finally, these arguments are coalesced into a workable and
practical rule the Court could use to address questions of law in
narrow and limited legal circumstances like those shown in
Hernandez.
In sum, it is argued that the Constitution, in limited
circumstances, may apply extraterritorially, as held in Boumediene.
So long as it is applied in a narrow context—here defined as a border
area under at least de minimus joint U.S.-Mexican control and
limited by a proximity test resting on the theories of curtilage,
maritime law and cannon-shot doctrine—the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonability standard of the “Search and Seizure” Clause should
apply in a case like Hernandez. Further, the creation of the U.S.Mexican border itself is examined as a jointly-held responsibility
under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.7
Taking all previous factors as true, an unlawful action by a
government agent renders them liable for such action and that a
Bivens-type remedy ought to apply.
Finally, circumstances such as those seen in Hernandez are the
political and international relations questions raised by such legal
questions. The ever-present political question doctrine is always
lurking in the shadows of cases such as Hernandez. Conventional
wisdom would speculate that Congress has not acquiesced to
government agent liability for constitutional violations of this sort
by failing to enact remedies for foreign nationals injured by

6. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
7. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, art. V, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
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government actors and agents when they fall dead on the “wrong”
side of the border. Some contend this is proof that there should not
be an application of even limited constitutional protections to a noncitizen, and thus, no remedy should be considered.
While Congress may legislate, extraterritorial Bivens –type
injuries raise constitutional questions. If the Constitution is
applicable, a remedy must necessarily follow. I argue that
application of U.S. law will aid, rather than harm U.S.-Mexican
relations by applying accountability for both the United States
constitutional and international legal standards of human rights
and ethical responsibility.

I.

THE RULE

In oral argument, the Court urged articulation of a rule
applicable to Hernandez-type situations.8 Justice Ginsburg herself
crafted the framework for such a rule when she observed:
[I]f all of the conduct happens in the United States and as a fact
there is some exercise of control right at the border, then if the injury
occurs in close proximity to that border, then that's a rule that would
both be workable and would take care not only of the issue with Sergio
Hernandez, but would also take care of the issue of the entirety of the
southwest border of the United States where the conduct continues
to occur even today.9

Unfortunately, Counsel for Petitioner was either not prepared
to describe such a rule, or unwilling to state one with limitations. I
propose one here. It is noteworthy that this proposed Hernandez
rule would be applicable only to narrowly-construed similar factual
situations. A narrow scope is essential when the Court considers
questions of law as highly-charged, politicized, and controversial as
applicability of U.S. constitutional rights extra-territorially. As
such, the proposed rule may be applied only in jointly-maintained
and patrolled U.S.- Mexican areas, such as the riverine/culvert
border. It would also apply only in scenarios where a U.S. agent's
unauthorized use of force crosses our boundaries and deprives a
foreign national of a fundamental privilege or immunity recognized
by U.S and or international law.

A. The Hernandez Rule (proposed):
When:
(1) An unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment;
(2) by an agent of the United States;
8. Oral Argument at 15, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15118), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-118.
9. Oral Argument at 25, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118).
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(3) in close proximity to or at a jointly-maintained U.S.Mexico border area and;10
(4) no alternative remedy exists; then
(5) any privileges and immunities arising under The
Fourth Amendment extend cross-border "as far as the
bullet travels," or a distance of at least fifty meters, and
liability arising from such action shall "travel back" to the
actor standing on U.S. soil.

B. The Drone-Military Exception
During the Hernandez oral arguments, one question that was
repeatedly raised was whether a workable rule governing crossborder shootings would impact U.S. military drone missions. To
cleanly assuage fears of this idea, there ought to be a military
exception for authorized military exercises or missions, including
drone operations. Of course, drone missions into a sovereign’s
territory raises its own constitutional questions, but those need not
be answered here.

II. LIMITED SCOPE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS ARISING UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT.
In this section, the history and application of both “functional”
and “practical” approaches used by the Court to decide the “if” of
how any constitutional right applies extraterritorially are
discussed. The theories of limited or partial United States control
or influence at and across the Mexican border are advanced by
examining maritime law doctrine, curtilage, cannon-shot doctrine
and the border creation itself under the Treaty of Hidalgo.
In an eerily similar case which happened after Hernandez, The
U.S. District Court for Arizona observed in Rodriguez v. Swartz
that:
[t]he U.S. Supreme Court stated three factors relevant to determining
the extraterritorial application of the Constitution . . . : (1) the
citizenship and status of the claimant, (2) the nature of the location
where the constitutional violation occurred, and (3) the practical
obstacles inherent in enforcing the claimed right. The relevant
obstacles include, but are not limited to, the consequences for U.S.
actions abroad, the substantive rules that would govern the claim,
and the likelihood that a favorable ruling would lead to friction with
another country's government.11

10. In which the United States exerts at least de minimis control.
11. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035 (D. Ariz. 2015).
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In large part, Hernandez’s nationality is not relevant here. If
he were a United States citizen gunned down in Mexico, the Fourth
Amendment would apply. If he were a Mexican national, killed in
the U.S. by a state actor, the Fourth Amendment would also apply.
In Rodriguez, a Mexican teen was walking home at night on
the Mexican side of the border along a street near his house. He was
alone, and not involved in any crime or aggressive action
whatsoever. Without warning or cause, U.S. Border Patrol agent
Swartz fired between 20-30 shots, striking the boy eight times,
killing him instantly.12
The
Rodriguez
Court
also
examined
the
Formalist/Functionalist factors and concluded that “the U.S. Border
Patrol’s use of force exerted its authority and control over the
immediate area on the Mexican side.”13
Further, the Court observed that “U.S. control of the Mexican
side of the border fence in Nogales and other areas along the
Southern border is apparent and longstanding and recognized by
persons living in this area.”14
Finally, the Rodriguez Court held that the boy was granted
Fourth Amendment protection, even though he was in Mexico at the
time of his death, and that agent Swartz was not protected by
immunity.15

A. American Stare Decisis: The Formalist - Practical
Analysis Battle
American jurisprudence is replete with examples of Courts
wrestling with applicability of constitutional rights and remedies
extraterritorially. The concept of the Federal Constitution riding
shotgun to the might of our nation is not new. In fact, these various
roots are historic through the formation of the colonies through
Westward Expansion. "There has been an ongoing debate in the
courts and across the country for more than a century over which,
if any, individual constitutional rights can be applied to restrain
governmental actions against non-citizens outside the United
States."16
The question of whether constitutional rights extended into our
territories and protectorates came to the forefront of American
jurisprudence in the notorious case of Dred Scott. There, the
Supreme
Court
upheld
constitutional
property
rights
extraterritorially.17 The question was then applied to U.S. colonial
12. Id. at 1028.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1041.
16. Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality
after Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (2009).
17. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (U.S. 1857).
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territories and protectorates in a series of cases collectively known
as The Insular cases. In these colonial cases, "It was hard to argue
that these territories were not under U.S. power, but did legal rights
follow this power?"18
The Insular cases responded by "formulating a test known as
the ‘impracticable and anomalous’ test,” which became the standard
by which extraterritorial applicability has been judged for over a
century."19 This test, however, bases questions of applicability
heavily on policy concerns such as: whether applying the
Constitution extraterritorially raises the possibility of conflicts in
foreign policy, and if so, would the result be anomalous?
The Insular cases confirmed that the Constitution, in its
entirety, applies to an "incorporated" territory (such as Puerto Rico)
and only fundamental rights applied ex proprio vigore, or, "of their
own force" beyond an unincorporated territory.20 "It would follow
then, that any applicability to any place beyond the actual [United
States-Mexican] border would necessarily need to be similarly
limited."21
Next, the Constitution's "application to U.S. governmental
action against aliens abroad has differed with respect to ‘structural
limitations’ on governmental power and those provisions that set
forth ‘individual rights.’”22 The courts have "generally treated
structural constitutional limitations, such as separation-of-powers
restraints, as applicable whenever and wherever the U.S.
government acts," as held recently in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.23

18. Kal Raustiala, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of
Territoriality in American Law, 328 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 511, 512 (2009).
19. Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality
after Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (2009).
20. Id. at 983.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 995-98 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(Rogers, J., dissenting), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Brief of Certain Former
Federal Judges as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner (Separation of Powers:
Enforceable at Guantanamo), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No.
05-184) [hereinafter Brief of Former Federal Judges]; Raustiala, supra note 18,
at 244-45 (“Structural provisions, such as bans on title of nobility, are arguably
different [from individual-rights provisions]. Because they determine the scope
of federal power, they apply everywhere the federal government acts.”); Robert
Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government Theory of
Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 641-42 (2007)
(supporting Judge Rogers’ position of a “non-rights based, limited-government
theory”); Jean-Marc Piret, Boumediene v. Bush and the Extraterritorial Reach
of the U.S. Constitution: A Step Towards Judicial Cosmopolitanism?, UTRECHT
L. REV. 81, 98 (2008) (“[T]he Suspension Clause is as much a limitation on
Congressional power as it is a source of individual rights.”); Jessica Powley
Hayden, Note, The Ties That Bind: The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and
Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J. 237 (2007).
23. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), superseded by statute, Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-3666, 120 Stat. 2600; Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804).
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Conversely, "only some of the constitutional provisions which grant
individual rights restrain government actions against aliens
abroad," which is exactly the scenario here.24
The stage then, has been set for the impracticable and
anomalous test of the Insular cases to spar with modern
jurisprudence in two important cases pitting competing theories of
constitutional extraterritoriality against each other.

B. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: A Formalist
Approach
The Petitioner’s brief asks whether "a formalist or functionalist
analysis govern the extraterritorial application of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unjustified deadly force, as applied to
a cross-border shooting of an unarmed Mexican citizen in an
enclosed area patrolled by the United States?" 25
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the question of whether the “Fourth Amendment applies to the
search and seizure by United States agents of property that is
owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”26
Verdugo-Urquidez held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply
“to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that
is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country.”27
This approach was based in part on the notion that "constitutional
protection of noncitizens necessarily stops where “de jure
sovereignty” ends," a hallmark of Formalist reasoning.28
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, disagreeing with the fourjustice opinion instead applied Justice Harlan's Insular Rule
standard of "impracticable and anomalous" to the question of a
warrantless search abroad, listing "several ‘conditions and
considerations’ that ‘would make adherence to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous,’”
including “[t]he absence of local judges or magistrates available to
issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable
conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and
the need to cooperate with foreign officials.” 29

24. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990)
(rejecting application of the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause to a search
conducted in Mexico); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1904)
(deciding that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial was inapplicable to
certain overseas territories).
25. Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at I, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259 (1990) (No. 88-1353).
26. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259.
27. Id. at 261.
28. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008).
29. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278.
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In this case, applicability of the implacability test would yield
different results. Unlike Verdugo-Urquidez, the violation of the
Fourth Amendment is unquestioned in Hernandez. Instead, the
question is simply, do the rights and protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment apply under these circumstances? Looking for
impracticability in enforcing the Fourth Amendment cross-cross
border in this case, one must ask: would such an application offend
Mexican law or offend U.S.-Mexican foreign policy? As Justice
Sotomayor observed during oral arguments in this case, the answer
is certainly the opposite, remarking that the Mexican government
would be offended at the thought of a United States government
actor's ability to kill a Mexican citizen without reproach or
recourse.30 Applying Fourth Amendment protection to Hernandez
in this case would produce neither an impracticable or anomalous
result.

C. Boumediene v. Bush: A Practical Approach
When last faced with the question of extraterritorial
application of the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Boumediene
soundly rejected Formalism and the impracticable and anomalous
test by refusing the argument that “as applied to noncitizens, the
Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends.”31
“De jure sovereignty is a factor that bears upon 'which constitutional
guarantees apply to a noncitizen,' but it is not 'the only relevant
consideration' in determining the geographic reach of the
Constitution.”32
Conversely, The Court settled the debate between Formalist
and Practical approaches to the application of the Fourth
Amendment in a cross-border incident by adopting Justice
Kennedy's functional extraterritoriality test put forth in his
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence holding that “questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns,
not formalism.”33
Under Kennedy's test, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
the "unjustified use of deadly force applies in the narrow context
presented in this case: a close- range shooting by a U.S. border agent
standing on U.S. soil."34 Answering impracticability once again,
nothing in this holding would offend Mexican-U.S. relations or
conflict with U.S. or Mexican law. The result, then, would not be
anomalous, rather it would help improve U.S.-Mexican relations by
30. Oral Argument at 118, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No.
15-118).
31. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755.
32. Id. at 764.
33. Id.
34. Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 27, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (No. 15118).
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eliminating the current "lawless border zone" currently operating
at the U.S. Mexican border.
Further, applying Fourth Amendment protections and
allowing a Bivens claim for abuses at border checks the currently
unrestrained Executive power to "use lethal force on innocent
civilians just outside our gates."35 Bivens then, can be seen as a
modern application of this right to sue those acting under color of
law for constitutional torts.

D. Common Law Roots of Extraterritorial Application
of the Right to Hold Liable Government Officials for
Tort and Other Actions
The notion of holding government officials liable for tortious
conduct against foreign nationals predates our Constitution. 36 The
Common-Law tradition set forth by Lord Mansfield was embraced
in early American jurisprudence by Chief Justice John Marshall,
James Madison, and Justice Joseph Story.37
Under English Common Law, British officers were subject to
English courts "even when acting abroad." 38 Further, "an officer
could override the presumption in favor of applying English law, but
only if he could show that he acted under the sheltering arm of
another country’s law that provided greater protections for his
conduct."39
Here, no sheltering arm is provided, because Mesa is not
afforded protection of Mexico's laws. In contrast, officer Mesa was
charged with murder under Mexican law.40 Moreover, United
States law also provides no safe harbor for Mesa's actions. Few
doubt that Mesa's killing of Sergio Hernandez was unreasonable
inside or outside of United States law. Indeed, Mesa's counsel
concedes that point, and instead relied on qualified immunity and

35. Id.
36. Brief for Professors James E. Pfander, Carlos M. Vasquez, and Anya
Bernstein as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003
(No. 15-118); see also James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and
Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1865–66 (2010).
37. Brief for Professors Supporting Petitioners at 15, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003
(No. 15-118).
38. Id. at 16; see also James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction
and the Global War on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 510-12 (2006); Mostyn
v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (1774) (opinion of Lord Mansfield: Minorcan
civilian successfully sued English military governor for damages for unlawful
detention in and subsequent banishment from Minorca).
39. Brief for Professors Supporting Petitioners, supra note 37, at 9; see also
Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1023.
40. Brief for the Government of the United Mexican States as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Petitioners at 10, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118).
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Formalist theory under Verdugo-Urquidez.41 They argue that even
though Mesa violated the Fourth Amendment, he is immune from
liability as the victim was both a foreign national and happened to
fall dead on Mexican soil.42
Further, Mesa contends that because no liability attaches to
him, and because applying the Boumediene Practical Approach
would create an anomalous effect regarding U.S.-Mexican political
relations, qualified immunity applies to insulate Mesa. 43
The application of extraterritorial claims against government
officials then, necessitates the remediation of extraterritorial claims
of harm. For example, the Story Court held that "U.S. revenue law
did not authorize federal officials to seize French ships in foreign
waters, but that general U.S. tort law did authorize the owners of
the French vessel to recover damages from those officials in U.S.
courts."44
Justice Story's holding highlights the requirement of remedies
for unlawful conduct of U.S. agents beyond our borders. This
remedial duty is explained in detail in his Apollon opinion as the
following:
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the
high discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to
act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by
summary measures, which are not found in the text of the laws. Such
measures are properly matters of state, and if the responsibility is
taken, under justifiable circumstances, the Legislature will doubtless
apply a proper indemnity. But this Court can only look to the
questions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they were,
justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable
redress.45

In short, a long, rich history stretches from English Common
Law, extending to and touching modern American jurisprudence.
Today, one may comfortably describe the right of a foreign national
to sue an American agent for constitutional tort which includes the
right to redress those grievances in U.S. Courts. Consequently, the
presence of a Fourth Amendment claim against an actor under color
of U.S. law necessitates the availability of a remedy.46 As Chief
Justice Marshall's holding in Madison v. Marbury, suggests; where

41. Brief of Respondent on the Merits, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15118).
42. Id.
43. Brief of Respondent on the Merits, supra note 41, at 17-20.
44. Apollon, 22 U.S. 362 (1824); see also Brief for Professors Supporting
Petitioners, supra note 37, at 18.
45. Apollon, 22 U.S. at 366-67.
46. It has long been thought that there can be no damnum absque injuria
(“loss without injury”); see also Holmes, O.W., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
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there is a right, there is a remedy. Justice Story then adds, “no
matter where that harm has occurred.47

E. International Law Also Requires Cross-Border
Remedies for Human Rights Violations
U.S. law has long taken notice of International Law, in that it
has "always been part of the federal common law, such that any tort
arising out of a violation of law of nations would be one arising out
of federal law."48 This is evident in the reliance on the law of nations
in the Alien Tort Statute, or ATS, which provides aliens within the
United States a tort claim mechanism for violations of the law of
nations, treaty, or United States law. 49
At first glance, the ATS would seem applicable here, but
remedy is foreclosed by the foreign country exception 2680(k) under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, through which ATS claims flow. This
exception bars claims “arising in a foreign country” as the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.50 The Sosa Court,
however, “recognized new claims under the law of nations." 51 It
would also be correct to assume that "the First Congress understood
that the district courts would recognize private causes of action for
certain torts in violation of the law of nations beyond those torts
corresponding to Blackstone's three primary offenses: violation of

47. Id.
48. Kurtis A. Kemper, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute
(28 U.S.C.A. § 1350)—Tort in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of United
States, 64 A.L.R. FED. 2d 417 (2012); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that legitimate interest in the orderly
resolution of disputes among those within its borders, and where the lex loci
delicti commissi (“law of the place where the delict [tort] was committed”) is
applied, it is an expression of comity to give effect to the laws of the state where
the wrong occurred).
49. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1948).
50. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
51. Id. at 697 (“When the United States declared their independence, they
were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and
refinement.”); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 U.S. 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.). In
the years of the early Republic, this law of nations comprised two principal
elements, the first covering the general norms governing the behavior of
national states with each other: “the science which teaches the rights subsisting
between nations or states, and the obligations correspondent to those rights,” E.
DE VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES § 3 (J. Chitty et al. transl. and ed.
1883) [hereinafter Vattel] (footnote omitted), or “that code of public instruction
which defines the rights and prescribes the duties of nations, in their
intercourse with each other.” 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *1.
This aspect of the law of nations thus occupied the executive and legislative
domains, not the judicial. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68
[hereinafter Commentaries] (“[O]ffences against” the law of nations are
“principally incident to whole states or nations.”).
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safe conducts; infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and
piracy."52
Simply stated, U.S. Courts ought to be receptive of
constitutional tort claims for cross-border wrongs and injuries.
When the violation of a fundamental right, such as a Fourth
Amendment claim for an extrajudicial killing is at issue, the court
should be especially receptive.

F. Agent Mesa's Extrajudicial Cross-Border Killing of
Sergio Hernandez Also Violates the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA)
The TVPA preempts the ATS by requiring liability for torture
or extrajudicial killings for claims under the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.53 To state a claim under the TVPA, the
Hernandez family must show that Sergio was the victim of an
extrajudicial killing.54 Under the Act, an extrajudicial killing is
defined as:
(a) For the purposes of this Act, the term ‘extrajudicial killing’ means
a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that,
under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority
of a foreign nation.

There is little question that the extrajudicial killing of
Hernandez was unlawful. The act of extrajudicial killing then
triggers liability acting under any authority of or color of law any
foreign nation.55
The Charter of the United Nations expressly states that in this
modern age a state's treatment of its own citizens is a matter of
international concern.56 Moreover, the Universal Declaration of
52. Kuris A. Kemper, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute (28
U.S.C.A. § 1350) – Tort in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of United States,
64 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 417, 2.
53. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (83) (1948).
54. Mamani v. Berzain, 21 F.Supp.3d 1353 (S.D.Fla. 2014) affirmed in part,
appeal denied in part 825 F.3d 1304 (“holding that Bolivian citizens sufficiently
alleged that the deaths of their relatives were extra-judicial killings, as required
to state a claim under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) against former
president and defense minister of Bolivia, where citizens alleged that the
government ordered military operations in several towns during period of civil
unrest, the government ordered soldiers to shoot at “anything that moved,”
many of the relatives were killed while far away from protests or attempting to
flee military personnel, and that military personnel chased and killed unarmed
civilians.”).
55. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (a) (1948).
56. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 59 Stat.
1033 (1945).
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Human Rights declares in plain language and definitively that "no
person should be subject to torture" or extrajudicial killings
[emphasis added].57 This Charter expressly embodies in it the
Universal Declaration precepts that "constitute basic principles of
international law."58
The General Assembly lays out its precepts of torture and
extrajudicial killings in its Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture 59 which provide the basis
for a claim under the TVPA. Specifically, the murder of Hernandez
violates multiple articles of the resolution.60 Article 11 expressly
provides for an avenue of redress for such violations, in contrast to
the claims by the United States that redress is unavailable to
Hernandez.
What the foregoing means is a simple truth: the extrajudicial
killing of Sergio Hernandez by agent Mesa not only violated U.S.
law, it violated international law and United States Treaty. In doing
so, it triggers rights and protections under the TVPA and the
Declaration of Human Rights, ensuring that a remedy should be
made available to Hernandez.

G. Agent Mesa Violated Border Patrol Protocol When
He Used Deadly Force
Even before the Hernandez and Rodriguez cases, the U.S.
Border Patrol has been reviewing its protocols and guidelines to
address the use of deadly force in border situations. The long list of
shootings and murders, and no doubt the negative public backlash
on both sides of the border, culminated in a 2013 Use of Force Study
commissioned by the Police Executive Research Forum. 61
57. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
58. G.A.Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
59. G.A. Res. 3452, Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture (1975).
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV. (“Each state shall, in accordance with the
provisions of this Declaration, take effective measures to prevent torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment from being
practiced within its jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST. art. V. (“The training of law
enforcement personnel and of other public officials who may be responsible for
persons deprived of their liberty shall ensure that full account is taken of the
prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. This prohibition shall also, where appropriate, be included in such
general rules or instructions as are issued in regard to the duties and functions
of anyone who may be involved in the custody or treatment of such persons.”);
U.S. CONST. art. XI (“Where it is proved that an act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has been committed by or at
the instigation of a public official, the victim shall be afforded redress and
compensation, in accordance with national law.”).
61. THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION USE OF FORCE REVIEW: CASES AND POLICIES 6 (2013).
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The report specifically covers rock throwing incidents, which
was the initial justification for the shooting.62 Officials went so far
as to claim agent Mesa was attempting to apprehend smugglers
trying to enter the U.S., who then “hurled rocks from close range.”63
This was later debunked when several eyewitness’ cellphone videos
surfaced, none of which showed Hernandez (or anyone else)
throwing rocks.64
In the report, the Commission found that, in instances where
agents claimed rock throwing as justification, “[t]oo many cases do
not appear to meet the test of objective reasonableness with regard
to the use of deadly force.”65 Indeed, the report advised that
“Officers/agents are prohibited from using deadly force against
subjects throwing objects not capable of causing serious physical
injury or death to them.” 66
Further, the Commission recommends that Border Patrol
officials should “train agents to de-escalate these encounters by
taking cover, moving out of range and/or using less lethal weapons.
Agents should not place themselves into positions where they have
no alternative to using deadly force.”67
Agent Mesa’s actions on the day he shot Hernandez were
virtually opposite of protocol and recommended use of force
guidelines, which the investigative team denied and found that
Mesa had acted reasonably.68
Official Border patrol policy is “[a] respect for human life shall
guide all members of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the use
of force. CBP officers/agents shall use only the force that is
objectively reasonable to effectively bring an incident under control,
while protecting the life of the officer/agent or others. Excessive
force is strictly prohibited.”69 Clearly, agent Mesa acted anything
but reasonably in light of the circumstances.

III. PROXIMITY: LIMITING SCOPE TO AREAS OF JOINT, OR
AT LEAST LIMITED OR PARTIAL UNITED
STATES CONTROL
The
Boumediene
Court
held
that
questions
of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns,

62. Brief of Respondent at 13, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017)
(No. 15-118).
63. Id.
64. Video Shows Border Shooting Scene, YOUTUBE.COM, https://youtu.be/oa
2LjgL40KE (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
65. THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 61.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9.
68. Brief of Respondent on the Merits, supra note 41, at 9.
69. THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 61, at 10.
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not formalism.70 These factors, then, necessarily implore us to
define the scope and limits of U.S. control at the U.S.-Mexican
border.

A. Boumediene Factors of United States Control
In Boumediene, applying functional theory to the
circumstances yields practical results. Functionality demands that
circumstances of Hernandez's reason for being in close proximity to,
or even across the actual border, as well as wider socio-economic
and cultural reasons to place him at that border are considered.
Further, the Boumediene Court identified three main factors
when applying its functional analysis: (1) “the citizenship and
status” of the person claiming protection, (2) the “nature” and
“physical location” where the alleged violation “took place,” and (3)
the “practical obstacles inherent” in applying protection. To these
can be added a fourth: whether the right asserted is “a fundamental
precept of liberty,” such as “freedom from unlawful restraint.” 71
We focus then on the most controversial second element; the
"nature" and "physical location" in which the incident took place.
The nature of the location provides the pivot on which the rule
turns. To understand the micro-location of the actual U.S.-Mexican
border in an urban setting such as El Paso-Juarez, we must look
beyond the culvert that contains the line of demarcation and expand
our focus to the unique characteristics of the entire border
community.

B. Defining United States-Mexican Border Overlap
In many instances and locations, the U.S.-Mexican border is an
inextricably intertwined community with centuries of history.
Indeed, deciphering where one community ends and another begins
is all but impossible in a practical sense, and the U.S.-Mexican
relationship has been described as “a relationship of unprecedented
closeness and cooperation.”72
1. Inter-Dependent Economics of the Region
In the location in question, the cities of El Paso and Juarez
were considered one city before the bifurcation imposed upon them
by the treaty of Hidalgo. Today, border or no border, the cities share
many common elements such as school systems, a central business
district, and other amenities. In addition, "because of the deep
70. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008).
71. Brief of Petitioner on the Merits, supra note 34, at 32.
72. Remarks by President Bush and President Fox, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5,
2001), http://nyti.ms/2fk865q.
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interconnectedness of the two communities, locals on both sides—
including 'the mayors [who] represent these two cities'—regard the
separation as “more or less a fiction.” 73 In terms of manufacturing
and trade, the maquiladoras (factories in Mexico that receive raw
materials from the U.S. and return finished goods) spark a local
shared economy in excess of 70 billion dollars annually.74
2. United States Cross-Border Power and Influence
Because of historical U.S. policy and dominance of the region,
the "U.S. has long wielded military, political, and economic
authority over northern Mexico.”75 This translates in modern times
to the U.S. Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies
conducting operations at or across the border regularly, and "their
presence—and the power they exercise—is not 'transient,' but
'constant.'"76 In recent years, U.S. policy has been to "project power
outwards" from the border, resulting in over 42 cross-border
shootings.77

IV. THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
"PROJECTING OUTWARD": A MODERN CANNON-SHOT
DOCTRINE, MARITIME LAW, AND THE TREATY OF
GUADALUPE-HIDALGO
The United States has long-enjoyed some, if not much,
influence and control over Mexican sovereign territory near the
border.78 Often, control has gravitated well beyond the physical
border, extending deep into Northern Mexico. 79 In the early part of
the nineteenth century, U.S. influence over Northern Mexican
territory was often military borne, and once U.S.-Mexican military

73.Leeser & Mocken, President Obama: Castner Connects The Past And
Future, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2016), http://huff.to/2fVay0A; see also
OECD Regional Stakeholders Committee, The Paso del Norte Region, U.S.Mexico: Self Evaluation, OECD REVIEWS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN REGIONAL
AND CITY DEVELOPMENT (2009), www.oecd.org/unitedstates/44210876.pdf.
74. State of Texas Comptroller's Office, COMPTROLLER.TEXAS.GOV, https://
comptroller.texas.gov/economy/docs/ports/96-1791-elpaso.pdf (last visited Feb.
9, 2018).
75. Bitran, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign
Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 244-48
(2014).
76. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 768-69 (2008); see App. 85a-86a.
77. Testimony of Michael J. Fisher, Chief, United States Border Patrol, DHS,
Feb. 15, 2011, Securing Our Borders—Operation Control and the Path Forward:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border and Maritime Security of the H. Comm.
on Homeland Security, 11 Cong. 8 (2011).
78. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848).
79. Id.
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hostilities ceased under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, U.S.
control and influence turned on economic interests.

A. Cannon-Shot Doctrine
When faced with determining how far “outward” United States
influence projects from our border, whether into a marine
environment or un-annexed territory, early Common Law and
maritime law jurisprudence set that figure arbitrarily as “the
territorial limits of the United States extend a marine league from
shore, [or] a cannon shot.”80 The distance the average cannonball
could be thrown was three miles. That length became the standard
by which cross-territory influence of the United States was deemed
to extend.81 This doctrine confirms a long-held notion that,
regardless of border, at least some United States influence extends
past any line of demarcation.
Applying doctrine to context, the implications are clear:
American power and influence does in fact travel across the U.S.Mexican border. For further conceptual exemplification, maritime
jurisprudence is especially handy.
1. Modern Cannon-Shot Doctrine: As Far as the Bullet Flies
The question then turns to the heart of the matter: if stare
decisis over the last century established that fundamental
constitutional rights are applicable abroad (in a limited fashion),
then those limits must be defined. The danger, of course, is
announcing a rule broadly endorsing encroachment into another’s
sovereign territory. The Rule must be limited, then, only to
circumstances where the incident is at or in close proximity to the
jointly maintained U.S.-Mexican border (as in Hernandez), and
arising from harms inflicted by an individual acting under color of
U.S. law, while standing on U.S. soil. The missing piece then
becomes: how far should such constitutional protections reach?
A common sense (practical) modern approach ought to limit
“outward projection” to the effective range of border patrol standard
issue firearms. While the typical 9mm round may travel over 2,000
meters before falling to the ground, effective range is only 100
meters or so.82 For this Rule, the practical limit should be 50 meters,
or the approximate width of the border river-culvert which serves
as the modern Rio Grande riverbed and border. This limitation
serves two purposes: (1) it now allows the concrete proximity point
of reference for application of the rule desired by the Court; and (2)
80. United States v. New Bedford Bridge, 27 F. Cas. 91, 120 (C.C.D. Mass.
1847).
81. United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 525, 535 (1865).
82. Range of a Handgun Bullet, THE PHYSICS FACTBOOK, http://hypertextbo
ok.com/facts/2002/DomnaAntoniadis.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2017).
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generally keeps the question of cross-border applicability of the
Fourth Amendment within the jointly maintained U.S.-Mexican
border proximity.

B. Applying Maritime Law Concepts in a Cross-Border
Riverine Scenario
For the most part, cannon-shot doctrine is no longer used. This
is not because the concept is void, but, as a rule, cross-territorial
questions of law in which a three-mile incursion would not cause an
international incident are rarities. That is not to say that no length
of cross-border incursion is the rule. For example, portions of the
U.S.-Canadian border between Quebec and Maine are subject to
confusing treaty and maritime law disputes over access to riverine
border waters.83 There, U.S. shipping intrudes upon sovereign
Canadian waters regularly to reach inland U.S. ports. 84
Thus, in situations where a formal border line of demarcation
exists, there is much precedent for United States influence, and
thus United States law to extend.

C. The United States-Mexican Border at El PasoJuarez is a Navigable Riverine Border Despite the
Currently Dry Conditions and thus Subject to
Maritime Law, United States-Mexican Water Rights
Treaty, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo
1. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848)
On February 2, 1848, the United States and Mexico signed the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended military hostilities
between the two nations.85 This Treaty then, is the instrument that,
among other things, details the creation of the border itself. Article
V of the Treaty enshrines the riverine border line of demarcation as,
“The Rio Grande, otherwise called the Rio Brave del Norte … from
thence up the middle of that river, following the deepest channel …”
which holds true today.86 However, today’s [dry] Rio Grande is, at
the location of the Hernandez murder, an artificial construct of
concrete and steel, jointly built and maintained by the United
States and Mexico. Article XI of the Treaty further provides that the
United States would defend incursions of “the savage tribes” cross-

83. Article: The law of the sea and LNG: Cross-Border law and politics over
Head Harbor, 37 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 131 (2012).
84. Id.
85. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, Art. V. (1848).
86. Id.
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border into Mexican territory, further delineating U.S. rights of
extension of cross-border policy.
What the Treaty also provides, is a base for the agreement of
water use rights for the United States that encroaches significant
distances into Mexico proper.
2. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico
Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944)
The “Water Rights Treaty of 1944” 87 formalized agreement to
decades of controversy between Mexico and the U.S. for the rights
of riverine border waters including the Rio Grande. 88 This Treaty
specifically clarifies Article IV of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
and establishes clear United States control over water rights well
into Mexican sovereign territory, incorporating or referencing
several other U.S.-Mexican Treaties in the process.89
Thus, U.S. influence and control, extending cross-border, has
been sound policy since the borders creation, and extends to this day
in a significant manner.

V.

ANALYZING CROSS-BORDER APPLICATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT UNDER THE BOUMEDIENE
PRACTICABLENESS FRAMEWORK PRESUPPOSES A BIVENS
CLAIM
A. Applying Bivens
Christina Duffy Burnett, in her Columbia Law Review article,
approached the question of extraterritorial application of the
Fourth Amendment by asking two questions: “whether a
constitutional guarantee applies in a given circumstance, and that
of how an applicable guarantee may be enforced.”90 Arguably, the
87. 59 stat.1219 (1944).
88. Id.
89. Convention between the United States of American and the United
States of Mexico Touching the International Boundary Line Where It Follows
the Bed of the Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado, Mex.-U.S., Nov. 12, 1884, 24,
Stat. 1011; Convention between the United States of America and the United
States of Mexico to Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in
the Treaty of November 12, 1884, and to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by
Reason of the Changes which Take Place in the Bed of the Rio Grande and that
of the Colorado River, Mex.-U.S., Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512; Convention
between the United States of American and the United States of Mexico,
Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, between the
Two Governments, known as the Water Boundary Convention, Mex.-U.S., Nov.
21, 1990, 31 Stat. 1936.
90. Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality
after Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 978 (2009).
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first question has already been resolved, both here as well as by the
Boumediene Court. The second turns on enforceability, which
necessarily indicates a remedy satisfied only by Bivens action.
The Fifth Circuit in Hernandez acknowledged that
"[u]nder Bivens a person may sue a federal agent for money
damages when the federal agent has allegedly violated that person's
constitutional rights."91 The Court then quickly backpedaled by
stating that Bivens was “not automatic” and that The Court has
refused to expand the scope of Bivens.92 While the foregoing may be
true, it is apparent that The Hernandez Court eagerly sought to
extend Bivens as evidenced by judicial commentary during oral
arguments.93 I suspect that the opinion will bear this out.94
Examining judicial comments during oral arguments, we find
the following exchanges by Justices observations during arguments.
Justice Kagan starts the discussion by asking if there should be a
Bivens claim, to which counsel replied “[y]ou have a U.S. law
enforcement officer exercising unreasonable force, and Sergio
Hernandez is in the group of victims that are injured because of
excessive force. The issue is, is where he fell and where he shot, does
it take it out of his right to a Bivens?” 95

B. If Bivens Applies, a Remedy Must Follow
Here, the Court reverts to the proximity question: How close in
proximity to a mutually managed border culvert does the incident
need to be to trigger constitutional protection, and thus, a Bivens
claim? As discussed above, the answer should apply within the
culvert itself, or approximately 50 meters (a curtilage of sorts).
Applying this rule, the Hernandez family would likely be able to
pursue a Bivens claim and, thus, a remedy.
Bivens, of course, found that it was well settled law that “when
a person’s rights were violated, and there was a federal statute that
provided a right to sue, that the courts could apply any available
remedy.”96

91. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Martinez-Aguero, 459 F.3d 618, 622 n.1 (2006)).
92. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (Bivens is "not an automatic
entitlement"); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (“The
Supreme Court has "consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new
context or new category of defendants.").
93. Oral Argument, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118).
94. Hernandez v. Mesa has not been decided at this writing.
95. Id. at 17.
96. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396 (1971).
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1. An Agent Under Color of Law Should Not be Granted
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects ‘all but
the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” 97
This immunity is measured by the objective reasonableness test,
assessed “in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at
the time.”98 This reasonableness factor is analyzed by the Court
from the prospective of a “reasonable officer on the ground” and thus
allows for reality that law enforcement officials often are required
to make instant decisions under stress and danger.99
Qualified immunity provides “a sweeping protection from the
entirety of the litigation process,” and not just a simple defense.100
It also provides a shield from “substantial social costs, including the
risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation
will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” 101
When an agent of the state is sued for their conduct under color of
law, courts must balance “the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to
shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when
they perform their duties reasonably.” 102
Courts must decide which of the two prongs of qualified
immunity analysis to address first.103 If the Court finds that one or
more constitutional rights were violated, and those rights “at issue
were clearly established at the time,” the next prong is then
considered.104 The second prong being a reasonableness analysis
establishing where “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 105 Qualified
immunity is then only applicable where both prongs are satisfied. 106
The Rodriguez Court held that the teen’s Fourth Amendment
was violated by agent Swartz. The Respondent’s in Hernandez
excuses fall short, as it is clear Hernandez also suffered a Fourth
Amendment violation. Applying the two-prong test, agent Mesa,
like agent Swartz, clearly fail, and thus no qualified immunity
applies.
97. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1028 (2015); see
Messerchmidt v. Millender, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1244-45 (2012) (citing Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
98. Id.
99. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F. Supp. 3d at 1028.
100. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
101. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
102. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
103. Rodriguez v. Swartz, 111 F.Supp.3d at 1039.
104. Id.
105. Id.; Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (citations omitted).
106. Id.; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
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2. Bivens Special Factors Analysis
Because Congress has failed to act and create a remedy
available for Mexican nationals harmed by unlawful action by U.S.
agents, we must also look for any “special factors that “counsel
hesitation” in applying Bivens.107 The Court identified one such
“special factor” in their “drone” line of questioning. 108 Here, though
perhaps quantified as a “quasi-military” agency, Border Patrol
agents are not subject to Feres protection.109
Another possible special factor may be that, by allowing
recourse against federal agents in the course of their duty, a chilling
effect on agent authority and operational effectiveness could result.
This argument, of course, is completely without weight as Bivens
already provides a remedy against federal agents who unlawfully
violate a person’s constitutional rights. The only difference here is
what side of the border Hernandez fell dead at.
The only other potential special factor that could “counsel
hesitation” is the effect of imposing such a remedy on U.S.-Mexican
relations. In this case, Mexico certainly has an interest in protecting
their citizens from being killed by U.S. agents, and they are
especially interested in providing for a remedy in those cases.
Extending U.S. constitutional protections in this case would not
interfere with the laws or policies of the Mexican government.
Indeed, applying the Fourth Amendment protections in case would
“show appropriate respect for Mexico’s sovereignty on its own
territory and for the rights of its nationals.” 110 In its Amicus Curiae
brief, the Mexican government expressly states that not granting a
remedy would be harmful to U.S.-Mexican relations.111 Surely, this
is exactly the sort of “special factor” that the Court envisioned when
contemplating a Bivens claim.
3. As of Now, the Hernandez Family Lacks a Remedy
The Fifth District found that, because they applied the
Verdugo-Urquidez formalistic approach and treated the border as a
“bright line,” there is no Fourth Amendment violation. Following
this flawed reasoning—never mind that agent Mesa’s actions were
unlawful and certainly a Fourth Amendment abuse had Hernandez
died on the U.S. side—that no violation occurred. And if no violation

107. Oral Argument at 4, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No.
15-118).
108. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971).
109. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
110. Brief of the Government of the United Mexican States as Amici Curiae
Supporting the Petitioners at 4, Hernandez, v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No.
15-118).
111. Id. at 5.
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occurred, by fateful virtue of Hernandez falling dead within Mexico,
then no Bivens claim and thus no remedy is available.
I reject this line of thinking. The Boumediene Court rejected
this line of thinking. Regardless of where Hernandez’s body fell,
agent Mesa was standing on U.S. soil when he pulled the trigger. It
is recognized in both U.S. and international law that when “an
illegal act is committed in one country and has a direct effect in
another country, it is well recognized that both countries have
jurisdiction to prescribe the applicable law, to punish violations and
to adjudicate disputes.”112
Because there are no impracticable or anomalous results when
applying U.S. law here, and because both the U.S. and Mexico have
fundamental rights and duties to protect their citizens, the
Boumediene and Bivens factors are satisfied, and thus a remedy
ought to follow.
4. Special Policy Considerations
Despite admitting that agent Mesa’s actions were unjustified
and unlawful, the U.S. has steadfastly refused to extradite Mesa or
any other border patrol agent for cross-border unjustified killings.
This sends a dangerous message. Allowing agents acting under
color of U.S. law to murder foreign nationals with no recourse sends
the message that the reverse may also be true. It is only a matter of
time before Mexican nationals decide that, they too can murder
United States citizens or Border Patrol agents without facing any
justice whatsoever. Is the idea of Mexican authorities looking the
other way as pot-shots are taken at U.S. Border Patrol agents
inconceivable?
By not providing Hernandez with a claim for remedy in U.S.
Courts, we are, by default, tendering our tacit approval of
extrajudicial killings without recourse or justice. This policy, it is
certain, is far more harmful to U.S.-Mexican relations than any
conceivable impracticalities of applying the Constitution. The
United States has everything to gain foreign relations wise, by
granting constitutional protections to victims of unjustified crossborder murders, and everything to lose by refusing.

CONCLUSION
Applying our newly minted Hernandez Rule to this case, we
find that because agent Mesa was acting under color of U.S. law,
and because agent Mesa was standing on U.S. soil when he shot
Hernandez cross-border, and because that unjustified killing
occurred at or in close proximity to the jointly governed and
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. d, §§ 421(2)(i)-(j), 431(1) (1987).

812

The John Marshall Law Review

[50:787

maintained border area and within 50 meters of that proximity,
then United States force, and thus United States law, and thus
United States constitutional protections under the Fourth
Amendment flowed through the barrel of agent Mesa’s gun and
travelled cross-border. Subsequently, a claim and a remedy flow
back to agent Mesa.
Because this is true, Hernandez was a victim of an unjustified
killing, which violated his right to life under international law, and
violated his protection from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. The place Hernandez’s body fell has no bearing.
Therefore the Fourth Amendment should govern, and Hernandez
has a cause of action against agent Mesa in a U.S. court under
Bivens, and a remedy ought to be made available.

